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Over a period of some 28 years, he has published 27 books. He resides in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
It is very difficult to briefly summarize Avi Sion’s philosophy, because it is so wide-ranging. He 
has labeled it ‘Logical Philosophy’, because it is firmly grounded in formal logic, inductive as 
well as deductive. This original philosophy is dedicated to demonstrating the efficacy of human 
reason by detailing its actual means; and to show that the epistemological and ethical skepticism 
which has been increasingly fashionable and destructive since the Enlightenment was (contrary to 
appearances) quite illogical – the product of ignorant, incompetent and dishonest thinking. 
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Abstract 
The Self is an inquiry into the concepts of self, soul, person, ego, consciousness, psyche and mind 
– ranging over phenomenology, logic, epistemology, ontology, psychology, spirituality, 
meditation, ethics and metaphysics. This book is a thematic compilation drawn from past works 
by the author. 
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Sample text (chapter 10) 
Critique of the Buddhist Five Skandhas 
doctrine 
 
In this essay1, I critically comment on the Buddhist ‘five skandhas’ doctrine. This doctrine is 
attributed to the Buddha himself and considered as a core belief of Buddhism2. However, in my 
humble opinion, in view of its evident intellectual limitations, this doctrine should not be given 
such elevated status. Buddhism and its founder have much more intelligent ideas to offer the 
world. That being the case, the present critique of the five skandhas doctrine should not be taken 
as a general critique of Buddhism or its founder. 
 
Although often listed in the literature, the five skandhas are rarely clearly defined and expounded 
on. The Sanskrit word skandha (Pali: khanda) means ‘aggregate’ – and apparently refers to a 
building-block, of the mind or perhaps of the world. In Sanskrit, the five skandhas listed are: 
rupa, vedana, samjna, samskara, vijnana (in Pali: rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara, vinnana). In 
the dozens of English texts that I have read over the years, I have seen these terms translated in 
various ways, and with rare exceptions barely explained. It is not made clear whether these terms 
are essentially phenomenological, psychological, metaphysical, ontological or epistemological. 
When interpretations are proposed, they differ considerably from one text to another. 
Nevertheless, this being an important doctrine in Buddhism, it is worth analyzing and evaluating. 
 
1. My Own Phenomenological Reading 
Before studying the normative interpretations of these terms, permit me to present my own initial 
interpretations, even while admitting that they are largely inaccurate historically. That way, the 
reader will know where I am coming from, and will be better able to follow my thinking. When I 
first came across the five skandhas in Buddhist books, I took them to constitute a sort of 
phenomenology, i.e. a list of the different categories of being or appearance, one that suggests an 
ontological and epistemological theory insofar as the list distinguishes and interrelates the 
categories in certain ways. Consider the following reading: 
• Rupa, usually translated as ‘form’, could be taken to refer to the apparently external and 
material world, which contains the phenomena of all shapes and sizes in motion that we seem 
                                                 
 
1  This essay was first posted in 2016 as a preview on the author’s blog. 
2  According to the Wikipedia article on this topic, the American Buddhist monk Thanissaro, in Handful of 
Leaves, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, p. 309, alleges that the Buddha “never defined a ‘person’ in terms of the aggregates” 
and that this doctrine is not pan-Buddhist. To my mind, if he said that (I have not seen it with my own eyes), he may 
well be right.  
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to witness through our senses, the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. This field of 
experience is quantitatively overwhelming, and takes up most of our existence, but is of 
course not the whole story, not the whole of our world. 
• Vedana, usually translated as ‘sensation or feeling’, could be taken to refer more specifically 
to the phenomena we experience as within our personal body. In a sense, these are part of the 
external and material world, since our body is apparently part of it; but in another sense, they 
are closer to home (i.e. more internal) and less material (i.e. containing some phenomena 
notably different from those we experience further afield). In this context, our touch 
sensations of bodies beyond our own body are feelings, as are all the myriad physical 
sensations we experience within our bodies, such as sexual feelings (desire, satisfaction), 
digestive feelings (hunger, thirst, satiety, stomach aches, sensations when urinating or 
defecating, etc.), and feelings in other internal organs (headaches, heart beats, heartburn, 
muscular cramps, nerve pains, etc.). Here would also be included emotional reactions 
experienced within the body, such as love (a flutter or warmth in the heart region), fear (a 
flutter or warmth in the stomach region), etc. In short, all the pleasures and pains we may be 
subject to within our bodies, whether they stem from physical or mental causes. Also to be 
included under this heading would be our sensations of volition (acts of will), i.e. the sense 
we have that we move our body parts around and our whole body through space; and 
therefore also our sensations of velleity (pre-volitions, attitudes, intentions). Note however 
that, while volitions and intentions may have phenomenal aspects, they are largely non-
phenomenal; i.e. they are intuited rather than perceived. 
• Samskara, usually translated as ‘mental formations’, and sometimes as ‘impulses to volition’, 
could be taken to refer to the inner phenomena we experience through our faculties of 
memory and imagination (the latter being voluntary or involuntary manipulation of memory 
items to produce somewhat new images, sounds, etc.). This includes the images of 
visualizations, the sounds of verbal thoughts, dreams (during sleep) and hallucinations (the 
latter being stronger projections, apparently into the space where matter resides, of 
imaginations). These phenomena resemble those experienced as external and material, in that 
they also have shape, color, sound, etc., and yet are experienced as substantially different, of a 
different ‘stuff’, so much so that we give them a different name (they are characterized as 
mental, as opposed to material), even if we do regard the mental phenomena, or phantasms, as 
derivatives of the material ones (through memory of experiences). Such mental phenomena 
obviously can and do condition (variously incite or otherwise affect) subsequent more overt 
actions. 
• Samjna, usually translated as ‘perception’, but often as ‘apperception’, ‘conception’ or 
‘cognition’, could be taken to refer to our various objects of cognition, i.e. whatever we intuit 
(non-phenomenal concretes), whatever we perceive apparently through the physical senses or 
mentally through memory and imagination (phenomenal concretes), and all the abstractions 
and theories (based on the preceding items) that we construct through conceptual insight and 
reasoning (including negation, similarity, dissimilarity, etc.). Thus, samjna would include our 
non-phenomenal impressions (apperceptions), our phenomenal experiences (perceptions), and 
the concepts and thoughts (conceptions) emerging from the preceding through which we get, 
not merely to experience things, but also to order and interrelate them, and thus to understand 
them (or be confused by them) to various degrees. Thus, note well, samjna focuses on objects 
in the context of their being cognized, i.e. as contents of cognition (and not as objects apart 
from cognition). 
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• Vijnana, usually translated as ‘consciousness’, could be taken to refer to the fact of cognition, 
the cognizing, as against its object (content), and its subject (the self apparently doing the 
cognizing). Consciousness has to be listed separately because it is substantially different from 
any of the other categories in our enumeration. Note well that, to assure a complete 
enumeration, this term in my view would have to include both the relation of cognition and 
the apparent self or soul which is related by it to the object. This refers to the self which we 
all routinely intuit – even though Buddhists deny the latter’s reality and consider it as illusory. 
This understanding is not entirely foreign to Buddhist practice, which tends to use the terms 
‘consciousness’ and ‘mind’ in an ambiguous manner that sometimes really (though typically 
without frankly admitting it) intends the self (i.e. the one who is conscious)3. Moreover, it 
should be stressed that the self not only cognizes, but also wills and values – i.e. that volition 
and valuation are among its powers as well as cognition, and that these three faculties are 
interdependent and do not exist without each other. 
That is to say in our present perspective: while rupa refers to external and material objects, 
vedana to more specifically bodily objects, and samskara to mental objects, and while samjna 
identifies these same categories of objects as contents of cognitive acts, vijnana refers to the 
implied knowing (and willing and valuing) acts and to the spiritual entities (ourselves) apparently 
engaged in them. From this we see that the various phenomenological categories here enumerated 
overlap somewhat: rupa includes at least part of vedana, samskara is a side-effect of rupa and 
vedana, samjna includes the preceding experiences and adds their more complex conceptual and 
rational products, while vijnana focuses on the subject and the relationship of consciousness (and 
volition and valuation) between it and these various concrete and abstract objects.4 
The above phenomenological account is merely, to repeat, my personal projection: it is the way I 
have in the past tended to interpret the five skandhas doctrine in view of the terminology used for 
it in English. This is the way I, given my own philosophical background, would build a theory of 
knowledge and being if I was forced to use these five given terms, even while aware that such 
theory contains some non-orthodox perspectives. 
 
2. A More Orthodox Psychological Reading 
However, Buddhists and other commentators present these terms in a rather different light. I will 
use as my springboard an interesting account I have seen on this topic by Caroline Brazier in 
Buddhist Psychology. Let us first look at this psychological approach, which I think is close to the 
original intent of the five skandhas doctrine, given that Buddhism is concerned with ‘enlightening 
and liberating’ people rather than with merely informing them to satisfy their curiosity. She 
writes:  
                                                 
 
3  I have often in my past writings pointed out the vagueness of the terms mind and consciousness in the 
discourse of Buddhist philosophers, and explained there how it allows them to get away with much fallacious 
reasoning. 
4  Note that in my listing, samjna is placed after samskara, which is not the usual order of listing. I could also 
have placed samjna after vijnana, since the latter category adds objects of cognition to be considered by the former. 
However, vijnana also has samjna as one of its objects, since the latter involves consciousness and a conscious 
subject; so the chosen order of presentation seems most logical. 
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“The skandhas are the stages in a process whereby the self-prison is created and 
maintained. At each stage, perception is infiltrated by personal agendas that create 
distortion. Delusion predominates…. Each of us continually seeks affirmation that we are 
that person who we have assumed ourselves to be. Situations that disturb this process are 
avoided or reinterpreted, and the self appears to become more substantial” (pp. 92-93). 
Her exposition of the stages is as follows (summarily put, paraphrasing her). The first stage is 
rupa, which is finding indications of self in everything we come in contact with; i.e. grasping 
onto all sorts of things because they reinforce our belief in having a self, and indeed one with a 
specific identity we are attached to. Next in the process comes vedana, which refers to our 
immediate value-judgments in relation to things that we come across (people, events, whatever); 
we may find them attractive, repulsive or confusing – but in any case, we have a visceral reaction 
to them that affects our subsequent responses to them. Thirdly comes samjna, which consists in 
spinning further fantasies and thoughts around the things we have already encountered and 
initially reacted to; due to this, we are unconsciously carried off into certain habitual behavior-
patterns. Samskara refers to these action and thought responses which we have, through repetitive 
past choices, conditioned ourselves into doing almost automatically. Finally comes vijnana, 
which refers more broadly to the mentality (perspectives and policies) we adopt to ensure our self 
is well-endowed and protected in all circumstances. 
These five stages constitute a vicious circle, in that the later stages affect and reinforce the earlier 
ones. They ensure that we enter and remain stuck in the cycle of birth, suffering and death. The 
important thing to note is that the purpose of this psychological description is to make us aware of 
the ways we ordinarily operate, so that we may over time learn to control and change those ways, 
and become enlightened and liberated. As Brazier puts it: “Buddhism is not a matter of just going 
with the flow. It is about changing course” (p. 95). In this approach, the skandhas doctrine is a 
practical rather than theoretical one. It is a ‘skillful means’, rather than an academic exposition. It 
is concerned with the ways we commonly form and maintain of our ‘self’. 
Needless to say, this looks like a very penetrating and valuable teaching5. The question for us to 
ask at this point, however, is whether it is entirely correct. That is to say, assuming the above 
sketch is an accurate rendition of the Buddhist theory of human psychology, is this the way we 
ordinary (unenlightened, unliberated) human beings actually function? Brazier, being a 
committed Buddhist, takes this for granted rather uncritically. I would answer that though this 
theory seems partially correct, it is certainly not fully so. What we have here, at first sight, is a 
portrait of someone who is (very roughly put): very narrow-minded (rupa), instinctive (vedana), 
irrational (samjna), habitual (samskara), and selfish (vijnana). This may fully describe some 
people, and it may partly describe all of us, but it is certainly not a complete picture of the 
ordinary human psyche. 
What is manifestly missing in this portrait are the higher faculties of human beings – their 
intelligence, their reason and their freewill. It could be argued that these higher faculties are 
present in the background, in the implication that people can (and occasionally do) become aware 
of their said lowly psychological behavior and make an effort to overcome it. But if so, this 
should be explicitly included in the description. That is to say, intelligence, reason and freewill 
                                                 
 
5  One that could be, and no doubt is, used in meditation. 
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should be presented as additional skandhas. But they are not so presented – it is not made clear 
that humans can function more wisely, and look at the facts of a situation objectively and 
intelligently, and decide through conscious reasoning how to best respond, and proceed with 
conscious volition to do so. In any case, these higher faculties are routinely used by most people, 
and not just used for the purpose of attaining enlightenment and liberation. 
Why are these higher faculties, which are common enough, even if to varying degrees, not 
mentioned in the Buddhist account as integral factors of the human psyche? I would suggest that 
the main reason is that the self (or soul) has to be dogmatically kept out of it6. The central pillar 
of the Buddhist theory of enlightenment and liberation is that our belief that we have a self is the 
deep cause of all our suffering, because a self is necessarily attached to its own existence, and the 
way out of this suffering is to realize that we do not really have a self and so do not need to attach 
to anything. In such a context, the human psyche must necessarily be described as essentially 
reactive and stupid, like a ship without a helmsman, at the mercy of every wind and current. 
Buddhism does regard humans as able to transcend these limitations, by following the ways and 
means taught by the Buddha in the Dharma; but it does not (in my opinion) fully clarify the 
psychological processes involved in self-improvement, no doubt due to the impossibility of 
verbally describing them with precision and generality. 
Brazier does go on to describe how Buddhist psychology conceives transcending of the skandhas. 
She does so in terms of the ‘five omnipresent factors’ being transformed into ‘five rare factors’ 
“through spiritual practice.” But of course, that account does not clearly say who is doing the 
spiritual practice, and what faculties are involved. It does not acknowledge that the individual 
person involved (the self) has to realize (through intelligence and reason) the need for and way to 
such transformation, and then proceed to bring it about (through complex volitional thoughts and 
actions). The self and its higher faculties are not given due recognition (because, as already 
explained, such recognition would go against the Buddhist dogma of no-self). This is not a fault 
found only in Brazier’s account, but in all orthodox Buddhist accounts. 
Understandably, Buddhism, particularly its Zen branch, rejects excessive intellectualism. 
Admittedly, intelligence, reason and freewill are all very well in principle, as tools for human 
betterment; but used in excess – or simply misused or abused – they can also and often do 
exacerbate human delusion and suffering. The intellect can be compulsively used to weave 
complex webs that distance its victim from reality rather than bring him or her closer to it. We 
can by such excess become more and more artificial and divorced from our true nature. Of that 
danger there is no doubt; it is observable. But intellectualism is surely not the whole story 
concerning our said higher faculties. Surely, they play a big role in improving our understanding 
and behavior, both in everyday life and in longer-term more intentionally spiritual pursuits. 
Moreover, we have to ask whether the five skandhas doctrine, even taken at face value, is truly 
consistent. We are told that rupa consists in viewing things in relation to self rather than 
                                                 
 
6  It is interesting to note in passing how modern physicists, biologist, psychologists and philosophers tend to 
similarly studiously ignore the human soul and its functions of cognition, volition and valuation, in their respective 
accounts of the world, life and humanity. But whereas Buddhism’s motive is to protect its dogma of no-self, the 
motive of modern ‘scientists’ is to protect their dogma of universal materialism and determinism. The intellectual sin 
involved in both cases is to deliberately make things look simpler than they are so as to make them fit more easily 
into one’s pet theory. 
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objectively, that vedana consists in immediate likes or dislikes, that samjna consists in making up 
associations, that samskara consists in conditioning, and that vijnana consists in selfish mentality 
– and it is all made to seem simple and mechanical. But is it? The Buddhist account itself tells us 
that these events are interrelated, i.e. stages in a process. Therefore, beneath each of them there 
must be complex mechanisms at play. Rupa must involve a certain sense of self and of its 
identity, to be able to select information of interest. Vedana, however instantaneous it may seem, 
cannot be immediate since it must be filtered through the subconscious scale of values of the 
person concerned. Samjna presupposes that there are older mental contents to which it associates 
new mental contents. Samskara refers to habits, which imply programming by repetition. And 
vijnana in turn implies storage of information and of valuations. 
Furthermore, even if we grant that the five skandhas reflect common tendencies within the human 
psyche, it is introspectively evident that normally the self can in fact, at every one of these stages, 
intervene through free will based on rational considerations and conscious valuations. That is to 
say, faced with the ego-centricity of rupa, we can still choose to view things more objectively; 
faced with thoughtless valuations of vedana, we can still choose to evaluate things in a more 
balanced manner; faced with wild associations of samjna, we can still choose to put things in 
context more accurately; faced with our bad samskara habits, we can still choose to resist 
temptations or overpower resistances; faced with native vijnana selfishness, we can still choose to 
act with larger perspectives in mind. The human psyche is not a mechanical doll, driven by forces 
beyond control – there is a responsible soul at its center, able (whether immediately or gradually) 
to impose its will on the rest of the psyche. Buddhists cannot consistently deny all this, since they 
do believe in and advocate self-improvement, as the Noble Eightfold Path makes clear. 
This brings us to the crux of the matter, the determinism tacitly involved in the five skandhas 
doctrine. The skandhas are imagined by Buddhists as dharmas, i.e. as “a series of consecutive 
impersonal momentary events,” as Vasubandhu put it7. No one is making them happen, they just 
happen each one caused by the ones preceding it and causing the ones succeeding it. They do not 
happen to someone, either, even if they seem to. They are “linked to suffering,” but no one 
suffers them. Clearly, there is logically no room, in this conception of psychological processes, 
for a person actually cognizing, understanding, evaluating, reasoning, deciding, choosing and 
engaging in action. Not only is the person removed, but the acts of cognition, valuation and 
volition are also removed. They are reduced to mere momentary electrical disturbances in the 
mental cloud8, as it were. They are no longer special relations between a subject or author and 
other things in the mind or body. This doctrine is, really, crass reification of things that are 
definitely not entities. 
                                                 
 
7  Quoted or paraphrased (not clear which) in Buddhist Scriptures, edited by Edward Conze. Vasubandhu was 
a Buddhist monk and major philosopher, fl. 4th to 5th cent. CE in Ghandara (a kingdom located astride modern-day 
Pakistan and Afghanistan). His philosophical posture is today normative, at least among the Mahayana, but it was 
opposed by a Hinayana school called the Personalists, which lasted for many centuries as of 300 BCE and involved a 
good many monks (e.g. an estimated 30% of India’s 200,000 monks in the 7th cent.). See pp. 190-197. 
8  Modern ‘scientists’ (I put the word in inverted commas deliberately, to signify criticism) would say much 
the same, but would place the electrical disturbances on the more physical plane of the brain and nervous system. 
The idea that the mind is a sort of very sophisticated computer is untenable, for exactly the same reasons that the idea 
of skandhas is untenable. 
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The five skandhas is clearly a mechanistic thesis, even if it is mitigated in a subterranean manner 
by the Buddhist faith in the possibility of enlightenment and liberation. In this view, logically, 
such spiritual attainment is itself merely the product of a chain of impersonal mental events, with 
no one initiating them and no one profiting from them9. This state of affairs is claimed to be 
known by means ‘deep meditation’, although it is not made clear who is doing the meditating, nor 
by means of what faculties or for what useful purpose. Clearly, objectively, however deep such 
meditation it could not possibly guarantee the verity of the alleged insights, but must needs 
submit them to logical evaluation in accord with the laws of thought. Scientific thought cannot 
accept any deep insights, or any revelations based on them, at face value; it demands rational 
assessment of all claims. 
In truth, granting that there is some truth to the psychological processes described by the 
skandhas doctrine, they must be viewed more restrictively as processes of ego-building, rather 
than so radically as processes of self-invention. They refer, not to ways that ‘we’ (a never 
explained yet still repeatedly used grammatical subject) imagine the self or soul to exist, but to 
ways that we (the truly existing self or soul, our real selves) constructs and maintains a particular 
self-image that we think flattering or securing. What is evident in honest, non-dogmatic 
meditation is that, while such processes can surely influence our mental and physical behavior, 
i.e. make things easier or more difficult for us, they do not normally determine it. An influence, 
however strong, can always (with the appropriate attitude and effort) be overcome. At almost 
every moment of our existence, we remain free to choose to resist these mental forces or to give 
in to them. If we but make the effort to be aware, to judge and to intervene as well as we can, we 
remain or become effective masters of our fate. 
It is only because we indeed exist as individuals, and have these powers of cognition, valuation 
and volition, that we can observe, identify, understand and overcome the impersonal forces 
described by the five skandhas doctrine. Therefore, in fact, the said doctrine, far from constituting 
an exhaustive listing of the basic building blocks of the human psyche, at best depicts just some 
surface aspects of much more complicated events and structures. Not only is the list incomplete 
in that it lacks overt reference to the human self and its higher faculties, but additionally its 
presentation of the five lower faculties (even assuming that these five faculties indeed exist) is 
rather superficial. For all the above reasons, and yet others, I view the five skandhas account of 
human psychology as deficient. 
As regards enlightenment, liberation and wisdom, these are impossible without a soul and its 
faculties of cognition, volition and valuation. Enlightenment means perfect cognition by the soul, 
i.e. a consciousness as high, wide and deep and accurate as can be for the person concerned. 
Liberation means perfect volition by the soul, i.e. a will as free of obstructions and as powerful as 
can be for the person concerned. Wisdom means perfect valuation by the soul, meaning full 
understanding of good and bad coupled with behavior that is accordingly fully virtuous and non-
vicious. Enlightenment, liberation and wisdom are concepts only applicable to sentient beings 
                                                 
 
9  One Victoria Lavorerio, in a paper called “The self in Buddhism,” has written: “If following Descartes we 
say that where there is a thought there is a thinker, the Buddhist would respond ‘where there is a thought, there is a 
thought’.” While rather witty, this statement is of course inane, since its author does not grasp the logical absurdities 
of the Buddhist no-soul thesis (and that, even though she quotes a couple of arguments of mine regarding them), but 
merely seeks to position herself fashionably. See her essay here: 
http://www.academia.edu/1489808/The_self_in_Buddhism. 
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(notably to humans and other animals, and perhaps in some sense to plants); they are irrelevant to 
non-spiritual entities (i.e. material and/or mental entities devoid of soul, such as skandhas, 
computers or fantasy creatures). 
 
3. The Metaphysical Aspects 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica (EB) defines the skandhas as “the five elements that sum up the 
whole of an individual’s mental and physical existence.” It lists them as “(1) matter, or body, the 
manifest form of the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water; (2) sensations, or feelings; (3) 
perceptions of sense objects; (4) mental formations; and (5) awareness, or consciousness, of the 
other three mental aggregates [i.e. items 2-4].”  
In most accounts I have seen, this theory is presented as descriptive of what constitutes a person. 
Some accounts I have seen, however, apply it more broadly, viewing the five skandhas as the 
constituents of the phenomenal world. In any case, this theory clearly contains an ontological 
thesis, insofar as it acknowledges two kinds of phenomena, the material (the first skandha) and 
the mental (the other four skandhas)10. Moreover, note in passing, since the above definition 
mentions the ‘four elements’, it includes a physical theory, one admittedly very vague and by 
today’s standards rather useless11. Secondly, the skandhas doctrine has some epistemological 
implications, in that it identifies sensations or feelings, perception of sense objects, and so on – 
implying our ability to know of such things, presumably by introspection. 
Furthermore, the said source (EB) explains that “The self (or soul) cannot be identified with any 
one of the parts, nor is it the total of the parts. All individuals are subject to constant change, as 
the elements of consciousness are never the same, and man may be compared to a river, which 
retains an identity, though the drops of water that make it up are different from one moment to the 
next.” This statement is the metaphysical element in the skandhas doctrine, since it involves 
important claims regarding the ultimate nature of individuals (i.e. persons, people). 
This explanation reminds us that the philosophical motive of the skandhas doctrine is to buttress 
the Buddhist claim that we have no self or soul (anatta). According to this doctrine, we are only 
clusters of the listed five material and mental phenomena, which are in constant flux, unfolding as 
a succession of events, each new event being caused by those before it and causing those after it. 
It is stressed that none of the skandhas is the self, and neither is their sum the self. The self is not 
something apart from them, either. What we call the self is a mere illusion, due to our conflating 
these ongoing, causally-linked events and giving them a name. 
                                                 
 
10  I assume that the Yogacara, Mind-Only, school would advocate that matter is a sort of mental phenomenon. 
In that case, they would presumably advocate that the skandhas theory concerns not only personality but the whole 
phenomenal world. 
11  It is worth noting, of course, that the fact that this simplistic, though ancient and widespread, theory of 
physics (with reference to the ‘elements’ of earth, air, fire and water, or similar concepts) is advocated by Buddhism 
is proof that this doctrine is not the product of any ‘omniscience’. If the Buddha indeed formulated it or accepted it, 
he cannot be said to have been ‘omniscient’ since this is not an accurate account of the physical world. This being the 
case, it is permitted to also doubt he was ‘omniscient’ in his understanding of the mental or spiritual world. Of 
course, it could be argued that he appealed to the four elements theory only because it was commonly accepted in his 
day, in the way of a ‘skillful means’, without intending to endorse it. 
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The no-self idea is usually expressed by saying that the human being is ‘empty of self’. This is 
presented as one aspect of a wider metaphysical doctrine of ultimate ‘emptiness’ (shunyata), 
applicable to all things in the phenomenal world. Initially, I suggest, Buddhist thought sought to 
replace the self we all naturally assume we have with the five skandhas. Since the doctrine of 
ultimate emptiness needed to be applied to the apparent self, an explanation of apparent selfhood 
was provided through the doctrine of the five skandhas. The self does not really exist; it is only 
made to appear to exist due to the play and interplay of the five skandhas. However, consistency 
required that the five skandhas be empty too. This was later acknowledged, for instance, in The 
Heart of the Prajnaparamita Sutra, which stated:  
“Form is emptiness, emptiness is form… The same is true with feelings, perceptions, 
mental formations, and consciousness.”12 
Here, the five skandhas, thanks to which the self seems to us to exist even though it is in fact 
empty, are affirmed to be empty too, note well. All phenomenal existents are empty, and this 
includes the skandhas too. The question might then well be asked (by me, at least): if the 
skandhas are equally empty, what ideological need have we of them? Why can we not just as well 
admit the existence of the self or soul, and call it ‘empty’ too, directly? This is of course a 
significant flaw in the doctrine of the skandhas – it shows the idea of them to be logically 
redundant. If the motive behind it was to explain the emptiness of self, it was not only 
unnecessary but useless, since the emptiness of skandhas also had to be admitted! Logically, far 
from simplifying things, the skandhas hypothesis complicated them. 
In other words, the Heart Sutra could equally well have stated: “self is emptiness, and emptiness 
is self;” or even: “soul is emptiness, and emptiness is soul.” And indeed, it could be argued that 
soul, being more insubstantial (less phenomenal) than the skandhas, is closer to emptiness than 
the skandhas are. There are obviously two concepts here to clarify – (a) soul and (b) emptiness. 
Additionally, we must (c) examine their interrelation. 
 
(a) The term soul refers to an entity of spiritual substance, i.e. of a substance other than the 
substances that material or mental things seem to have. Soul has no phenomenal characteristics – 
no shape or color, no sound, no flavor, no odor, no hardness or softness, no heat or cold, etc. That 
is to say, it cannot be cognized by external perception (using the five sense organs) or by internal 
perception (using the proverbial mind’s eye, and its analogues, the mind’s ear, etc.). This does not 
mean it cannot be cognized by some other, appropriate means – which we can refer to as 
apperception or intuition.  
Just because the soul is not phenomenal, it does not follow that it does not exist. Buddhists 
apparently cannot understand this line of reasoning. In the West, David Hume (Scotland, 1711-
76) evidently had the same problem. Looking into himself, he could only perceive images and 
thoughts, but no soul. Obviously, if you look for something in the wrong place or in the wrong 
way, you won’t find it. If you look for something non-phenomenal in a field of phenomena, you 
won’t find it. If you look for color with your ears or for sound with your nose, you won’t find 
them. To look for the soul, you just need to be intuitively aware. All of us are constantly self-
                                                 
 
12  Given in full in Thich Nhat Hanh’s The Heart of Understanding (Berkeley, Ca.: Parallax Press, 1988). 
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aware, even though we cannot precisely pinpoint where that self is. There is no need for advanced 
meditation methods to be aware of one’s soul – it is a common, routine occurrence. 
Note well that I am not affirming like René Descartes (France, 1596-1650) that soul is known 
through some sort of inference, namely the famous cogito ergo sum, i.e. “I think therefore I am.” 
We obviously can and do know about the soul through such rational means, i.e. through abstract 
theorizing – but our primary and main source of knowledge of the soul is through direct personal 
experience, which may be referred to as apperception or intuition. So, my approach is not 
exclusively rationalist, but largely empiricist. In this, note well, my doctrine of the soul differs 
radically from the Cartesian – as well as from the Buddhist.  
According to Buddhist dogma, one cannot perceive the soul in meditation; if one observes 
attentively one only finds various mental phenomena (the five skandhas, to be exact). But I reply 
that the soul is manifestly a non-phenomenal object and should not be conflated with such overt 
phenomena. We all have a more or less distinct ‘sense of self’ most if not all of the time, without 
need of meditation. 
This is obvious from the very fact that everyone understands the word ‘self’. Buddhism admits 
this sense of self, but absurdly – quite dogmatically – takes it to be ‘illusory’. Having at the outset 
dismissed this significant ‘sense’ (intuition) as irrelevant, it is not surprising that it cannot find the 
soul (i.e. the human self) in the midst of the phenomena of mind (the five skandhas)! Note this 
well – Buddhism has no credible argument to back its no-soul thesis. It begs the question, 
calling the sense of self illusory because it believes there is no self, and claiming that it knows by 
introspection that there is no self while rejecting offhand the ordinary experience of self we all 
have. As a result of this manifest error of reasoning, if not outright doctrinaire dishonesty, 
Buddhism becomes embroiled in many logical absurdities. 
Just as one would not look for visual phenomena with one’s hearing faculty or for auditory 
phenomena with one’s visual faculty, so it is absurd to look for spiritual things (the soul, and its 
many acts of consciousness, will and valuation) with one’s senses or by observing mental 
phenomena. Each kind of appearance has its appropriate organ(s) of knowledge. For spiritual 
things, only intuition (or apperception) is appropriate. 
To understand how the soul can exist apparently in midst of the body and mind (i.e. of bodily and 
mental phenomena) and yet be invisible, inaudible, etc. (i.e. non-phenomenal), just imagine a 
three-dimensional space (see illustration below). Say that two dimensions represent matter and 
mind and the third applies to spirit. Obviously, the phenomena of mind will not be found in the 
matter dimension, or vice versa. Similarly, the soul cannot be found in the dimensions of matter 
and/or mind, irrespective of how much you look for it there. Why? Simply because its place is 
elsewhere – in the spiritual dimension, which is perpendicular to the other two. Thus, it is quite 
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Note well that the above illustration of the spiritual as located in another dimension is intended 
as merely figurative, and not to be taken literally, because the concept of dimensions is itself a 
material-mental concept based on the perception and projection of space. Even the idea of time 
as a fourth dimension relative to the three dimensions of space is mere analogy; all the more so, 
the idea of spirit as a further dimension (or maybe a set of dimensions) is somewhat artificial. The 
simple truth is that spirit cannot really or fully be expressed in material or mental terms, 
being so very different, truly sui generis. We might likewise object to the image of mind as a 
distinct dimension (or set of them) in comparison to matter, but mind does have some 
phenomenal characteristics in common with matter whereas spirit cannot be said to be at all 
phenomenal. So, to repeat, the above analysis of these three domains with reference to 
dimensions is merely a convenient metaphor. 
Furthermore, it would be epistemologically quite legitimate to claim the existence of soul on 
purely abstract, conceptual grounds. This is justifiable with reference to the principles of 
adduction. One can hypothesize an entity, if such assumption serves to explain various observable 
concrete phenomena. In the case of soul, the ‘phenomena’ involved are our commonplace 
experiences of cognition, volition and valuation. These experiences are largely intuitive too, but 
they make their manifest mark in the fields of mind and body. We experience cognition whenever 
we perceive or conceive anything. We experience volition whenever we think or do anything. We 
experience valuation whenever we like or dislike anything. Soul explains all these experiences by 
means of a central entity. This is akin to, say, in astronomy, discovering a planet invisible to our 
telescopes by observing the displacement of other celestial bodies around it. This is inductive 
logic. 
But in truth, soul is not a mere abstraction; it is a concrete (though spiritual) thing that can be 
cognized directly using our inner faculty of intuition, to repeat. One error Buddhists make is to 
confuse entity and essence. The claim of a soul is not a claim of essence, but of entity. The soul is 
not the essence of the body, or even of the body-mind complex – it is a distinct entity that resides, 
somehow, in the midst of these phenomena, and affects them and is influenced (and perhaps also 
affected) by them, but does not have the same nature as them. It is a substance, but a very 
different and insubstantial substance, as already pointed out. Indeed, to call soul an entity or 
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substance is really just metaphor – analogical thinking. In truth, soul is so different from the other 
constituents of the world that it can only be described by means of analogy – it cannot really be 
reduced to anything else we know of. 
We can see the said philosophical error made, for instance, in the Milinda-panha, a non-canonical 
but orthodox Theravada (Pali) text13. Here, Milinda questions Nagasena, after the latter claims not 
to really exist. He asks him very pertinent questions such as who, then, is it that eats, engages in 
spiritual practices, keeps morality, gains merit, etc. The latter replies by giving the example of a 
chariot, pointing out that no part of the chariot can be considered as the chariot, nor even the 
combination of all the parts. Milinda, whose questions were excellent, is very easily taken in by 
Nagasena’s answers. But (to my mind) we need not be. 
For a start, a chariot cannot be considered as analogous to a person. We do not look upon a 
chariot as like a person, for the simple reason that it does not have capacities of cognition, 
volition and valuation. To look for the analogue of a soul in a chariot is to commit the red herring 
fallacy. Moreover, while it is true that a chariot contains no ‘core entity’ which can be so called, 
and it is true that no one part or combination of its parts can be used to define it, it still has an 
‘essence’. A chariot, as a man-made object, is defined by means of its purpose or utility – as a 
horse-drawn carriage, used for transport and travel, especially in war or hunting or racing. Its 
essence is an abstraction, not a concrete entity. Certainly, all the required parts must be there to 
form a functioning chariot, but these parts can be changed at will for other parts like them (though 
not for other parts unlike them: e.g. one cannot replace a wheel with a shoe). The one constant in 
it is the said abstract purpose or utility.14 
The same reasoning does not apply to persons, obviously. So, Nagasena’s argument was in fact 
beside the point. As already mentioned, a soul is not an essence, but a core (spiritual) entity. It 
therefore cannot be viewed as one of the five skandhas, nor as the sum of those skandhas, as the 
Buddhists rightly insist. It can, however, contrary to Buddhist dogma, be viewed as one of the 
parts of the complete person, namely the spiritual part; but more precisely, it should be viewed as 
the core entity, i.e. as the specific part that exclusively gives the whole a personality, or selfhood. 
This is especially true if we start wondering where our soul came from when we were born, 
whether it continues to exist after we die, where it goes if it does endure, whether it is perishable, 
and so forth.  
This brings us to the question as to whether the soul is eternal or temporary, or (in more Western 
terminology) whether the soul is immortal or mortal. Eternal would mean that it has existed since 
the beginning of time and will exist till the end of time. Temporary would mean any shorter 
period of time, though it may be very long indeed. Temporary could mean as long as the current 
body lives, or it could mean for many lifetimes – and that with or without physical bodies.  
                                                 
 
13  See Conze, pp. 147-151. The dialogue is given in full here. Milinda (Gk. Menander) was the “Greek ruler of 
a large Indo-Greek empire [namely Bactria] in the late 2nd century BC.” Nagasena was a senior Buddhist monk. The 
text was, according to EB, “composed in northern India in perhaps the 1st or 2nd century AD (and possibly originally 
in Sanskrit) by an unknown author.” 
14  Similarly, a river, though not man-made, can be defined by means of abstractions. This is said with 
reference to the analogy proposed by EB earlier on. 
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It seems that Indian philosophy had no place for temporary souls, only eternal souls or no-souls – 
with regard to soul, it was all or nothing15. However, this disjunction is philosophically untenable. 
It is conceivable that the soul is an epiphenomenon of the living human (and more broadly 
animal, or at least higher animal) body, which comes into existence with it and ceases to exist 
when it does. Or it may be that this temporary soul lasts longer, transmigrating from body to body 
or maybe existing without a body. We do not know (at least, I don’t); but what is sure is that 
these are conceptual possibilities that cannot be ignored. Certainly, non-Buddhist humanity has 
found them conceivable, since many religions are based on such alternative beliefs. 
As regards the eternal soul, the question is whether such a soul can or cannot be liberated from 
the (alleged) cycle of birth and death. Does eternity of the soul logically imply its eternal 
imprisonment in suffering? I do not see why. It is conceivable that the eternal soul was once 
happy, then somehow fell into suffering, but can still pull itself out of its predicament through 
spiritual practices. It may well be, even, that its liberation depends on a spiritual program like the 
Four Noble Truths of Buddhism; i.e. on realizing that it is in a vicious circle of suffering, that this 
suffering is caused by attachment and can be cured by non-attachment, and that such non-
attachment can be cultivated through the Noble Eightfold Path. So, there is nothing inherently 
contradictory to Buddhism in the assertion of an eternal soul. I am not advocating this, only 
pointing out that it can consistently be advocated contrary to established dogma. 
What is sure, in any case, is that the no-soul idea is logically untenable. Buddhists have never 
squarely faced the logical problems it raises and honestly tried to solve them. They are always 
inhibited by the fear of being regarded by their peers as heretical holders of ‘false views’; so, they 
keep repeating the no-soul catechism and keep trying to justify it (using absurd means such as the 
tetralemma, which puts forward the nutty idea that something can both be and not-be, or that 
something can both not-be and not-not-be). The use of the five skandhas doctrine as an 
explanation of the (alleged) illusion of selfhood simply does not convince any honest observer, as 
above shown. Buddhist preachers say that individuals should not take Buddhism on faith, but try 
and think the issues through for themselves, and they will see the logic of it. But when someone 
does so, and comes to a different conclusion and rejects one of their clichés, they are nonplussed 
if not hostile. 
The truth is that it is impossible to formulate a credible theory of the human psyche without 
admitting the existence of a soul at its center. Someone has to be suffering and wanting to escape 
from suffering. A machine-like entity cannot suffer and cannot engage in spiritual practices to 
overcome suffering. Spiritual practice means, and can only mean, practice by a spiritual entity, 
i.e. a soul with powers of cognition, volition and valuation. These powers cannot be equated 
electrical signals in the brain, or to events in the skandhas. They are sui generis, very miraculous 
and mysterious things, not reducible to mechanical processes. Cognition without consciousness 
by a subject (a cognizing entity) is a contradiction in terms; volition without a freely willing 
agent (an actor or doer) is a contradiction in terms; valuation without someone at risk (who stands 
to gain or lose something) is a contradiction in terms. This is not mere grammar; it is logic. 
                                                 
 
15  For instance, in the Hindu Bhagavad-Gita, the atman (individual soul) is said by Krishna to be: “unborn, 
undying; never ceasing, never beginning; deathless, birthless; unchanging for ever.” (The Song of God: Bhagavad-
Gita.) 
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An important question as regards the soul is whether it is the same throughout its existence, or 
alternatively it spiritually changes (for better or worse) over time. This issue is important as it 
could affect responsibility, and reward or punishment (karma, in Buddhism). Granting that the 
soul is responsible for its acts of will at the time of such actions, is it just for the soul to receive 
the consequences of such actions at a later time? Should I pay in my old age for the vices of my 
youth that I no longer indulge in, or get the belated rewards for my youthful virtues even if I no 
longer have them? If the soul is unchanging through time, the answer would obviously be yes. 
But if the soul does evolve or devolve over time, the answer might at first sight seem negative. 
Can it still be said that the same person involved in such case? 
Different solutions to this problem might be proposed. First, we should emphasize that much of 
the karmic load (for good or bad) of our lives is placed in our mental and bodily dimensions, our 
mind and body. The question here posed is whether some of the karmic load is placed in our 
spiritual dimension, our soul. If we say that the soul is constant, we must place all apparent 
spiritual changes related to it in its mental and physical environment. Thus, the same soul as a 
baby has more limited powers of walking, talking, etc.; as an adult, his intellectual and bodily 
powers reach their peak; in old age, they gradually deteriorate.  
Moreover, if one thinks and acts in a saintly manner, one is likely to have a pleasant inner life and 
probably outer life too; whereas, if one thinks and acts in a depraved manner, one is likely to have 
an unpleasant inner life and probably outer life too. But what of in some supposed afterlife, when 
the soul is without body or mind? The choices a person makes at any given time reflect its total 
circumstances at that time. If I am the same across time, then in principle if I were put back in the 
same circumstances I would react the same way to them. This would seem contrary to the 
principle of free will, which is that whatever the surrounding influences the soul remains free to 
choose – and is therefore ultimately unpredictable.  
A better position to adopt may be that proposed by Buddhism in the context of the five skandhas 
doctrine. I am referring to ‘the Burden Sutra’ expounded by Vasubandhu16:  
“The processes which have taken place in the past cause suffering in those which succeed 
them. The preceding Skandhas are therefore called the ‘burden’, the subsequent ones its 
‘bearer’ [of the burden].” 
We could adapt the same idea to the soul (instead of the skandhas), and say that since its present 
existence is caused by its past existence, it is in a real sense at all times a continuation of its past, 
carrying on not only its existence but also its good and bad karma. In this way, even if the soul 
(the ‘bearer’) has undergone inner changes, it remains responsible for its past deeds (the 
‘burden’). The past becomes cumulatively imbedded in the present and future. In that case, we 
must ask the question: what changes are possible within a soul? Is it not a unitary thing? Can it 
conceivably have parts? This would seem to take us back full circle to a psychological 
description, such as the one proposed in the five skandhas theory!  
However, I would suggest that such questions are not appropriate in the spiritual realm, which is 
not quite comparable to the material and mental realms. The soul, being non-phenomenal, cannot 
be thought of as having size or shape or even exact location, or as increasing or decreasing in 
content – these concepts and others like them being drawn from the phenomenal realms. We 
                                                 
 
16  In Conze, again (p. 195). 
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should rather accept that we cannot describe the soul, any more than we can truly fathom its 
ultimate workings. Just as cognition, volition and valuation are sui generis world-events, so is the 
soul too special to fit into any simplistic analogies. 
It should be added that the view of the soul here proposed is not very far, in many respects, from 
the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature. Consider the following brilliant statements by Son Master 
Chinul17: 
“The material body is temporal, having birth and death. The real mind is like space, 
unending and unchanging….  
The material body is a compound of four elements, earth water, fire, and air. Their 
substance is insentient; how can they perceive or cognize? That which can perceive and 
cognize has to be your Buddha-nature….  
In the eyes, it is called seeing. In the ears, it is called hearing…. In the hands, it grabs and 
holds. In the feet, it walks and runs…. Perceptives [sic] know this is the Buddha-nature, 
the essence of enlightenment. Those who do not know call it the soul…. 
Since it has no form, could it have size? Since it has no size, could it have bounds? 
Because it has no bounds, it has no inside or outside. Having no inside or outside, it has 
no far or near. With no far or near, there is no there or here. Since there is no there or here, 
there is no going or coming. Because there is no going or coming, there is no birth or 
death. Having no birth or death, it has no past or present….”18 
Clearly, the “real mind” which is “like space,” the “Buddha-nature” which alone can “perceive 
and cognize,” that which sees and hears and grabs and walks, i.e. that which is the Subject of acts 
of consciousness and the Author of volitional acts, corresponds to what we commonly call the 
soul, even if the said writer refuses to “call it the soul.” It is noteworthy that, despite the Buddhist 
dogma that cognitive and volitional acts do not imply a self, this writer seems to advocate that 
they do (even while virtuously denying selfhood). Is then the difference between these concepts 
merely verbal? I would say not. The idea of the soul suggests individuation (in some realistic 
sense), whereas that of Buddha-nature has a more universal connotation (with apparent 
individuality regarded as wholly illusory). 
 
(b) Let us now examine the Buddhist concept of Emptiness. Note at the outset that I make no 
claim to higher consciousness, and have no interest in engaging in fanciful metaphysical 
speculations using big words. I write as a logical philosopher, an honest ordinary man intent on 
finding the truth without frills. By ‘emptiness’, most Buddhists do not mean literal vacuity, or a 
void (non-existence). It may be that some Hinayana thinkers understood the term that way, but I 
gather Mahayana thinkers viewed it more positively (or ambiguously) as referring to ‘neither 
existence nor non-existence’. The latter expression is meant to reject both excessive belief in the 
existence of the phenomenal world (Eternalism) and excessive belief in the non-existence of the 
phenomenal world (Nihilism). It is intended as a golden mean – a ‘middle way’. 
                                                 
 
17  Korea, 1158-1210. 
18  Classics of Buddhism and Zen, vol. 1. Tr. Thomas Cleary. Pp. 417-419, 424. 
20 AVI SION  
However, as regards this concept of ‘middle way’, it is inaccurate (quite muddle-headed, in fact) 
to say, as Buddhists do, that this emptiness is ‘non-dualistic’, suggesting that it literally includes 
all opposites, i.e. allows of effective contradiction. All that can be said is that emptiness 
comprises everything that is positively actual, whether in the past, present or future. Just as 
actuals are never contradictory, i.e. just as contradiction never occurs in reality at any time or 
place (not even, upon reflection, in the mind), so emptiness does not admit of contradictions. 
Contradiction is certainly illusory, and any claim to it is necessarily false. ‘Non-dualistic’ must be 
taken to mean (more accurately) unitary, undifferentiated. It refers to the actual positive, not to 
any imagined negative. 
Often, it is implied that Emptiness corresponds to the Absolute, the Infinite, Ultimate Reality, the 
Original or Primordial ground of Being, or of Mind, the One, Nothingness, the Noumenon, and so 
forth. This concept, and some of the terminology used for it, are of course not entirely foreign to 
other philosophies and religions. 
From its Pre-Socratic beginnings, Greek philosophy has sought for the underlying unity of the 
many, what lies beneath the variegated phenomenal world, the common ground of all things we 
commonly experience, from whence things presumably come and to which they presumably go 
(as it were). These ideas culminated in Neo-Platonism in late Antiquity, and returned to Western 
philosophy in the late Middle Ages and in the Renaissance in various contexts. Comparable 
notions are also found in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and of course in other Indian religions, 
notably Hinduism – especially in their respective more mystical undercurrents. Greek philosophy 
has of course influenced these various religions, and they have also demonstrably influenced each 
other, in this respect. There has also no doubt been influences from and to Buddhism, as the 
above mentioned Milinda-panha attests, being a dialogue between a Greek king and a Buddhist 
monk. 
With regard to our bodies, or to matter in general, it is often argued that though they appear 
varyingly ‘substantial’ (including gases and liquids with solids), if we go deeper into their 
composition, as we nowadays can, we shall find mostly empty space, with only very rare particles 
of mass, which are just pockets of energy anyway, connected by insubstantial fields of force. But 
the obvious reply to that is that this would still not be total void; i.e. even if matter is not as full 
and substantial as it at first appears, that does not mean that there is nothing in it at all.  
Nevertheless, I do not think that the Buddhist concept of emptiness applied to matter refers to this 
empty space with very rare substantiality. Rather, I think that it refers to the assumed universal 
and unitary common ground of all things, which is conceivable as pure existence, prior to any 
differentiation into distinct entities, characteristics or events. This root existent cannot be 
described or localized, because to do so would be to ascribe to it some specific character or 
location to the exclusion of another. 
With regard to mental phenomena, by which I mean the stuff of memories and derived 
phantasms, which apparently occur our heads, they seem much less substantial than material 
ones, but nevertheless they are phenomenal insofar as we perceive them as having colors, shapes, 
sounds, and perhaps also (though I can’t say I am sure of it) also odors, flavors and feelings of 
touch. We must also in this context pay attention to concrete feelings and emotions which appear 
to occur in our bodies or heads, which we would collectively classify as touch-sensations.  
It is worth noting the importance touch-sensations play in our view of matter: the ‘solidity’ we 
ascribe to matter is defined in terms of the resistance we experience when we push it, pull it or 
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squeeze it, as well as with regard to the evident relative duration of the object at hand. No matter 
how much empty interspace matter may in fact contain, the experience of solidity (to various 
degrees) remains, and strongly determines our sense of ‘materiality’. Mental phenomena, in this 
context, appear far less ‘solid’ than material ones, being able to dissolve more quickly and to be 
relatively more malleable (and in some respects less so). The Buddhist adjective ‘empty’ should 
not be taken to mean ‘devoid of solidity’, for solidity (as just explained) is a phenomenological 
given and therefore cannot be denied. 
Additionally, in my view, we must take into consideration, as mental ‘phenomena’ in an 
expanded sense (more precisely, ‘appearances’), objects of intuition like self, consciousness, 
volition and valuation, even though they are quite non-phenomenal, i.e. devoid of color, shape, 
sound, etc. All these existents can also, and all the more so, be regarded as empty, if we 
understand the concept correctly as above suggested. 
According to Buddhism, this root and foundation of all existence, which is somewhat immanent 
as well as transcendental, can be known through meditation, or at any rate when such meditation 
attains its goal of enlightenment. In this, Buddhism differs from Kantian philosophy, which views 
the noumenal realm as in principle unattainable by the human cognitive apparatus (even though 
Kant19 evidently claimed, merely by formulating his theory, quite paradoxically, to at least know 
of it).  
Nevertheless, the two agree on many points, such as the characterization of the phenomenal realm 
as illusory while the noumenal is real. What is clear is that emptiness refers to a universal and 
unitary substratum, which is eminently calm and quiet, and yet somehow houses and even 
produces all the multiplicity and motion we perceive on our superficial plane. The world of 
phenomena rides on the noumenal like ocean waves ride on the ocean. Water and waves are 
essentially one and the same, yet they are distinguishable by abstraction; likewise, with regard to 
the noumenal and phenomenal. 
Mention should be made here of the Buddhist theory of the codependence or interdependence of 
all dharmas. According to this theory, everything is caused by everything else; nothing is capable 
of standing alone. That precisely is why everything (i.e. all things in the world of phenomena) 
may be said to be empty – because it has no ‘own being’ (svabhaha). This means that not only we 
humans, and all sentient beings, are empty of self, but even plants and inanimate entities are 
empty. This may sound conceivable at first blush, but the notion of interdependence does not 
stand serious logical scrutiny. The claim that everything is a cause of everything is a claim that 
there is at least a partial, contingent causative relation between literally any two things. But such 
causative relation must needs be somewhat exclusive to exist at all20. So, the idea put forward by 
Buddhist philosophers is in fact fallacious, a ‘stolen concept’. 
It should also be said that the term ‘emptiness’, insofar as it is intended negatively, i.e. as 
indicative of privation of existence, is necessarily conceptual. We can say that being comes from 
and returns to non-being, but it must be acknowledged that this is something that cannot be 
known by direct experience, whether ordinary or meditative, but only by conceptual insight. The 
simple reason for this is that negation cannot be an object of perception or intuition, but can only 
                                                 
 
19  Immanuel Kant (Germany, 1724-1804). 
20  See my The Logic of Causation, chapter 16.3, for a full refutation. 
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be known by inductive inference from an unsuccessful search for something positive21. Only 
positives can be experienced. All negative terms are, logically, necessarily conceptual; indeed, 
negation is one of the foundations of conceptual thought. Thus, any claim that one has purely 
experienced, in the most profound levels of contemplation, the Nothingness at the root of 
Existence, is not credible: reasoning (even if wordless) was surely involved. 
For Buddhism, the original ground is something impersonal, though some might view it as a sort 
of pantheism. For the above mentioned major religions, the original ground is identified with 
God. In my opinion, such identification is more credible, because I do not see how the conscious, 
willful, and valuing individual soul could emerge from something greater that is not itself 
essentially conscious, willful, and valuing. These faculties being higher than impersonal nature, 
their ultimate source must potentially have them too. In Jewish kabbalah, for instance, the human 
soul is viewed as a spark of the Divine Soul (a chip off the old block as it were). We are in God’s 
image and likeness in that, like Him, we have soul, cognition, volition and valuation, although to 
an infinitesimal degree in comparison to His omniscience, omnipotence and all-goodness. But in 
any case, it is clear that there is some considerable agreement between the various philosophies 
and religions. 
 
(c) Let us now consider soul in the context of emptiness. Is the concept of self or soul logically 
compatible, or (as the Buddhists claim) incompatible, with that of emptiness? Can a soul find 
liberation from its limitations and suffering, or is it necessarily stuck in eternal bondage to birth 
and death, deluded by endless grasping and clinging to things of naught? Is liberation only 
possible by giving up our belief the soul? If the answer to these questions is in accord with 
Buddhism, the five skandhas doctrine would seem to be useful; but if a soul can (through 
whatever heroic efforts of spiritual practice) extricate itself from the phenomenal and reach the 
noumenal, then that doctrine would seem to be, at best, redundant, if not ridiculous. 
Consider, first, a temporary soul (whether its existence is limited to one lifetime or it spans 
several lifetimes, either in a body or disembodied). Such a soul, necessarily, like all other 
impermanent existents that have a beginning and an end, has come from emptiness and will 
return to emptiness; it is created and conditioned, by the uncreated and unconditioned One. 
Moreover, a temporary soul might even be regarded as eternal in the sense that it has a share in 
eternity, not only when it temporarily exists manifestly as a distinct entity, but even before its 
creation and after its apparent destruction, when it is still or again an undifferentiated part of the 
original ground. So, no problem there, other than finding out precisely how to indeed liberate it 
(no mean feat, of course). 
A problem might rather be found with regard to an eternal soul, and this is no doubt what caused 
Buddhists to be leery of the very idea of self (which they regarded as necessarily eternal, 
remember). The problem is: if the individual soul (or anything else, for that matter) stands side by 
side with the ultimate reality throughout eternity, then how can it ever merge with it? No way to 
liberation would seem conceivable for a soul by definition eternally separate from emptiness. But 
even here, we could argue that the separation of the distinct soul from the universal unitary matrix 
is only illusory; i.e. that all through eternity this indestructible soul is in fact a constant emanation 
                                                 
 
21  See my Ruminations, chapter 9. 
 THE SELF 23 
from the abyss and really always imbedded in it. What makes an illusion (e.g. a mirage or a 
reflection) illusory is not how long it lasts (a split second or a billion years), but its relativity (a 
mirage is due to refraction of light from an oasis, a mirror image of the moon is due to reflection 
of light from the moon). So, in truth, even an eternal soul can conceivably be reconciled with 
emptiness. I am not affirming the soul is necessarily eternal in that sense, but only pointing out 
that it conceivably could be so. 
In conclusion, the skandhas idea serves no purpose with regard to the requirement of emptiness. 
Indeed, it is highly misleading, since it is based on false assumptions concerning other doctrinal 
possibilities. Buddhists cling to this idea for dear life, but without true justification. Clearly, the 
position taken here by me is that logically we can well claim that people have a soul, and reject 
the orthodox Buddhist belief that what we call our self is nothing but a cluster of passing 
impersonal events, without giving up on the more metaphysical doctrine that at the root of 
spiritual (i.e. every soul’s) existence there is ‘emptiness’ as here understood. 
Just as we can say that apparently substantial material, or concrete mental, phenomena are 
ultimately empty, so we can say that the soul each of us consists of is ‘substantial’ in its own 
rarified, spiritual way and at the same time ultimately empty, i.e. at root just part of the universal 
and unitary ground of all being. In other words, contrary to what Buddhist philosophers imagined, 
it is not necessary to deny the existence of the soul in order to affirm its ‘emptiness’, any more 
than it is necessary to deny the existence of the body or mind in order to affirm their ‘emptiness’. 
That is to say, there is no logical necessity to adopt the five skandhas idea, if the purpose of such 
position is simply to affirm ‘emptiness’. 
 
4. In Conclusion 
The fact of the matter is that the no-soul thesis is riddled with contradictions. We are told by 
Buddhists that we can find liberation, but at the same time that we don’t even exist. We are told to 
be conscious, but at the same time we are denied the power of cognition – i.e. that the soul is the 
subject of cognitive events. We are told to make the effort to find liberation, but at the same time 
we are denied possession of volition – i.e. that the soul is the free agent of acts of will. We are 
told to make the wise choices in life, but at the same time we are denied the privilege of value-
judgment – i.e. that the soul is capable of independent and objective valuation. 
The no-soul thesis is upheld in spite of these paradoxes, which were well-known to Buddhist 
philosophers from the start. What is the meaning of spirituality without a spirit (soul, self)? Who 
can be liberated if there is no one to liberate? Why and how engage in spiritual practice if we not 
only do not exist, but also have no power of consciousness, volition or valuation? Why bother to 
find release from suffering if we do not really suffer? Who is writing all this and who is reading 
it? The no-soul thesis simply cannot be upheld. The soul can well be claimed to be ultimately 
‘empty’ in the aforesaid sense, but the thesis of five skandhas instead of a soul is logically 
untenable. 
We have seen that the five skandhas doctrine cannot be regarded as an accurate description of the 
human psyche in its entirety. It is not a thorough phenomenological account, since it ignores 
mankind’s major higher faculties – intelligence, rationality and freewill. It focuses exclusively on 
some petty aspects of human psychology, the five skandhas, without openly acknowledging the 
more noble side of humanity, which makes liberation from such pettiness possible. It has 
metaphysical pretensions, with ontological and epistemological implications – notably, the idea 
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that we are empty of soul, devoid of personality – but it turns out that this idea does not stand up 
to logical scrutiny, being based on circular arguments and foregone conclusions. 
Thus, whereas the five skandhas thesis may have at first seemed like an important observation 
and idea, which applied and buttressed the more general Buddhist thesis of emptiness, and at the 
same time provided a spiritually useful description of human psychology, it turns out to be a 
rather limited and not very well thought-out creed. This does not mean that it has no worth at all, 
but it does mean that it is far less important than it is made out to be. 
This being said, I hasten to add that the present criticism of this one doctrine within Buddhist 
psychology and philosophy is not intended as a blanket belittling or rejection of Buddhist 
psychology and philosophy. Certainly, Buddhist psychology and philosophy have a great deal 
more to offer the seeker after wisdom than this one doctrine. It is rich in profound insights into 
the human psyche and condition, which every human being can benefit from. This is evident 
already in the opening salvo of Buddhist thought, the Four Noble Truths, which acknowledge the 
human condition of suffering and identify the psychological source of such suffering in clinging 
to all sorts of vain things, and which declare the possibility of relief from suffering through a set 
program of spiritual practices. 
In the Buddhist conception of human life, our minds are poisoned by numerous cognitive and 
volitional and emotional problems. At the root of human suffering lies a mass of ignorance and 
delusion about oneself and the world one suddenly and inexplicably finds oneself in. These give 
rise to all sorts of unwise desires, including greed (for food, for material possessions) and lust (for 
sexual gratification, for power), and aversions (fears, hatreds). The latter impel people to act with 
selfishness (in the more pathological sense of the term), and in some cases with dishonesty or 
even violence (coldness and cruelty), and generally with stupidity. But Buddhism proposes ways 
to cure these diseases, so its outlook is essentially positive. 
Clearly, Buddhism has a particularly ‘psychological’ approach to life. It is also distinguished by 
its businesslike, ‘no blame’ approach to spirituality, which is no doubt why many people in the 
West nowadays are attracted to it. Unlike most of the other major religions, notably Judaism and 
its Christian and Islamic offshoots, it does not try to make people feel guilty for their sins, but 
rather encourages them to deal with their problems out of rational self-interest. It is thus less 
emotional and more rational in many ways. 
Judaism too, for instance, includes psychological teachings, although perhaps to a lesser extent. 
One of the main features of Judaic psychology is the idea that humans have two innate tendencies 
– a good inclination (yetzer tov) and a bad inclination (yetzer ra’)22. These two inclinations 
influence a person for good or for bad in the course of life (physical life and spiritual life), but 
                                                 
 
22  This two-inclinations psychological thesis of course stands in contrast to three other theses: that humans 
have only a good inclination (optimism), or only a bad inclination (pessimism), or no natural inclination at all 
(neutrality). This is an interesting issue that deserves a longer discussion. The difference between these four theses is 
moot, if we consider that all this is about influences on the soul, and not about determinism or fatalism; the soul 
remains free to choose whether influenced one way or the other to greater or lesser degree. I think the point of the 
Jewish doctrine is simply this: to make the individual aware that he is constantly under pressure from influences of 
various sorts, some good and some bad, and that he is wise to at all times identify with the positive ones and avoid 
identifying with the negative ones; i.e. to regard the true ultimate desire of his soul as the good and to regard the bad 
as delusive nonsense. 
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they never control one, for human beings are graced with freewill. This means that come what 
may, a man or woman is always (at least, once adult) responsible for his or her choices. This 
ethical belief in freedom of choice and personal responsibility is present in Judaism since its 
inception, as the following Biblical verse makes clear: “Sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee is 
its desire, but thou mayest rule over it” (Gen. 4:7)23. Knowing this, that one indeed has freedom 
of will, one can overcome all bad influences and forge ahead towards the eternal life. 
In Buddhism, we may discern a similar possibility of taking full responsibility for one’s life in the 
very first chapter of the Dhammapada (1:1-2). “If a man speaks or acts with an impure mind, 
suffering follows… If a man acts with a pure mind, joy follows.” Although the five skandhas 
doctrine gives people the impression (as shown above) that they are not responsible for their 
deeds, we see here that this is not really the message of Buddhism, which generally enjoins strong 
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23  The idea of ‘inclination to evil’ may also be traced to the Bible, namely to Gen. 8:21, which quotes God as 
stating that “the inclination of man’s heart is evil from his youth.” (That is said after the Deluge; earlier, in Gen. 6:5, 
it is said more pessimistically that “every inclination of the thoughts of his [man’s] heart is only evil all through the 
day.” Commentators explain the difference by suggesting that the Deluge made man wiser. Maybe the difference 
between the terms “the inclination of man’s heart” and the “inclination of the thoughts of man’s heart” has some 
significance.) 
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